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Abstract
Recently adversarial attacks on automatic speaker verification
(ASV) systems attracted widespread attention as they pose se-
vere threats to ASV systems. However, methods to defend
against such attacks are limited. Existing approaches mainly
focus on retraining ASV systems with adversarial data aug-
mentation. Also, countermeasure robustness against differ-
ent attack settings are insufficiently investigated. Orthogonal
to prior approaches, this work proposes to defend ASV sys-
tems against adversarial attacks with a separate detection net-
work, rather than augmenting adversarial data into ASV train-
ing. A VGG-like binary classification detector is introduced and
demonstrated to be effective on detecting adversarial samples.
To investigate detector robustness in a realistic defense scenario
where unseen attack settings exist, we analyze various attack
settings and observe that the detector is robust (6.27% EERdet
degradation in the worst case) against unseen substitute ASV
systems, but it has weak robustness (50.37% EERdet degra-
dation in the worst case) against unseen perturbation meth-
ods. The weak robustness against unseen perturbation methods
shows a direction for developing stronger countermeasures.
Index Terms: speaker verification, anti-spoofing counter-
measures, adversarial attack, adversarial samples detection
1. Introduction
Automatic speaker verification (ASV) systems aim at confirm-
ing a claimed speaker identity against a spoken utterance. It has
been widely applied into commercial devices and authorization
tools, such as household speakers, car navigation systems, e-
banking authorization, etc. However, recent studies have shown
that a well-trained ASV system could be deceived by malicious
attacks [1–3]. In the last decade, the speaker verification com-
munity held several ASVspoof challenge competitions [4–6] to
develop countermeasures mainly against replay [7, 8], speech
synthesis [9, 10] and voice conversion [10, 11] attacks.
Very recently, another threat, named adversarial attacks, has
been explored on ASV systems. Adversarial attacks slightly
perturb the input so that the system will make incorrect deci-
sions. Kreuk et al. [12] added adversarial perturbations into
a testing utterance to attack an end-to-end ASV system. The
attack was verified to be successful in both cross-feature and
cross-corpus settings. Li et al. [13] extended the studies into
This work was done when Xu Li was an intern at Tencent AI Lab.
other ASV frameworks and observed the adversarial trans-
ferability from one ASV to attack another ASV. Also some
works explored adversarial attacks in practical real-time scenar-
ios [14–16] and attacks on spoofing countermeasures [17].
Apart from the effective perturbations that pose severe
threats on ASV systems, the perturbation variations caused by
different attack settings also bring difficulty in developing de-
fense approaches. In a realistic attack, different substitute ASV
systems can be used to craft adversarial samples and perform
effective attack on the target ASV system in a transferable way
[13]. The choice of a substitute ASV system, as one of attack
settings, results in different perturbation patterns. Besides, per-
turbation patterns also vary greatly across perturbation meth-
ods [18] with different perturbation configurations, e.g. pertur-
bation degrees. So countermeasure robustness against different
attack settings, including substitute ASV systems, perturbation
methods along with perturbation configurations, is another im-
portant concern.
Defense approaches against adversarial attacks have been
investigated mostly in the image domain [19–21]. Defense ap-
proaches explored in ASV area are still very limited. Wang et
al. [22] leveraged adversarial samples into training an end-to-
end ASV as a regularization to improve system robustness. Wu
et al. [23] adopted a combination of spatial smoothing [20] and
adversarial training [24] to strengthen countermeasures against
adversarial samples. Both methods are found to be effective.
However, they need to retrain a well-developed ASV system
with adversarial data augmentation. To the best of our knowl-
edge, no existing work investigates countermeasure robustness
against different attack settings of spoofing ASV systems.
Inspired by [21, 25], this work makes the first attempt to
defend ASV systems against adversarial attacks with a separate
detection network. A VGG-like [26] binary classification sys-
tem is introduced to capture the difference between adversarial
and genuine samples, and predict whether an input is adversarial
or not. A separate detection countermeasure has the following
advantages: 1) It separates the defense part and speaker veri-
fication into two independent stages, which avoids retraining a
well-developed ASV model. 2) Since most existing counter-
measures for replay and synthetic speech attacks are based on
a separate detection network [7–9], the proposed approach pro-
vides the feasibility to develop a unified countermeasure against
all spoofing attacks.
In a realistic defense scenario, attack settings cannot be ac-
cessed by the defender so that the proposed detector can be de-
graded by unseen attack settings. To investigate detector ro-
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bustness in such a realistic scenario and provide directions for
developing stronger countermeasures, this work also gives a ro-
bustness discussion based on unseen attack settings, including
substitute ASV systems, perturbation methods and perturbation
degrees. In this work, the three most representative ASV frame-
works are used as variations: Gaussian mixture model (GMM)
i-vector system [27], time delay neural network (TDNN) x-
vector system [28] and ResNet-34 r-vector system [29]. Two
of the most effective perturbation methods, i.e. basic iterative
method (BIM) [18] and Jacobian-based saliency map approach
(JSMA) [30], are applied to generate adversarial samples.
The contributions of this work include: 1) Design of a ded-
icated defense network against adversarial attacks, rather than
augmenting adversarial samples into ASV training; 2) Introduc-
ing a VGG-like network and demonstrating its effectiveness on
detecting adversarial samples; 3) Investigating detector robust-
ness against unseen attack settings to uncover vulnerability and
lack of robustness against unseen perturbation methods, which
provides directions for developing stronger countermeasures.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion 2 details the process of adversarial samples generation. The
proposed adversarial samples detection network is illustrated in
Section 3. Section 4 analyzes the experiment results. Finally,
Section 5 summaries this work.
2. Adversarial Samples Generation
In a speaker verification task, given acoustic features of the en-
rollment utterance X(e) and testing utterance X(t), a well-
trained system function S with parameters θ will predict a sim-
ilarity score, which indicates speaker similarity between the en-
rollment and testing utterances. From an adversary’s perspec-
tive, it will optimize a perturbation δX to be added onX(t) so
that the system will behave incorrectly: either falsely rejecting
the true target’s voice or falsely accepting the imposter’s voice.
The optimization problem can be formulated as Eq. 1 and 2,
δX = arg max‖δX‖p≤
k × Sθ(X(e),X(t) + δX) (1)
k = { −1, target trial
1, non-target trial (2)
where the constraint p-norm of δX within perturbation degree 
guarantees a subtle perturbation so that human cannot perceive
the difference between adversarial and genuine samples.
To investigate detector robustness against different attack
settings, we leverage three different ASV system architectures
and two perturbation methods in our experiments. The details
for ASV systems and perturbation methods are illustrated in
Sections 2.1 and 2.2, respectively.
2.1. ASV systems
In this work, we adopt three different ASV systems as fol-
lows: GMM i-vector with probabilistic linear discriminant anal-
ysis (PLDA) back-end [27], TDNN x-vector with PLDA back-
end [28] and ResNet-34 r-vector with cosine back-end [29]. In
this work, all three ASV models adopt cepstral frequency with
the same settings in [13] as input features.
The i-vector system [27] consists of 2048 mixtures with full
covariance matrix. T matrix projects utterance statistics into a
400-dimension i-vector space. The i-vectors are centered and
length-normalized before PLDA modeling.
The x-vector system adopts the network architecture in
[28], except that AAM-softmax loss [31] with hyper-parameters
{m = 0.3, s = 32} is used for training the extractor. Extracted
x-vectors are centered and projected by a 200-dimension LDA,
then length-normalized before PLDA modeling.
The r-vector system has the same architecture as [29], and
AM-softmax loss [31] with hyper-parameters {m = 0.2, s =
30} is used for training networks. Extracted r-vectors are cen-
tered and length-normalized before cosine scoring.
2.2. Perturbation methods
In this work, BIM [18] and JSMA [30] are involved to generate
adversarial samples.
BIM perturbs the genuine input X(t) towards the gradient
of the objective w.r.t. X(t) in a multiple-step manner to gener-
ate adversarial samples. It optimizes the perturbation with the
norm constraint parameter p in Eq. 1 being∞. Starting from the
genuine input X(t)0 = X
(t), the input is perturbed iteratively
as follows:
X
(t)
n+1 = clipX(t),(X
(t)
n + αsign(∇X(t)n Sθ(X
(e),X(t)n ))),
for n = 0, ..., N − 1 (3)
where sign is a function that takes the sign of the gradient, α
absorbs the trial indicator k and its absolute value is the step
size,N is the number of iterations and clipX(t),(X) holds the
norm constraints by applying element-wise clipping such that
‖X −X(t)‖∞ ≤ . In our experiments, N is set as 5, and α
is set as perturbation degree devided by N .
JSMA is another effective perturbation method to craft ad-
versarial samples. Unlike BIM that adds perturbations to the
whole input, JSMA perturbs only one bit at a time. In each
iteration, it selects the bit with the most significant effects on
output to be perturbed. With this purpose, a saliency score is
calculated for each bit and bit with the highest score is cho-
sen to be perturbed. We formulate the algorithm specialized
in our case, as shown in Algorithm 1. The saliency map
at Step 4 computes the absolute value of gradient G while
masking out the bits already reach the constraint boundary:
saliency map(G,Γ) = GabsΓ, whereGabs is the element-
wise absolute value ofG and  is an element-wise product op-
erator. In this work, N is set as 300 iterations, and α is set as
half of the perturbation degree.
Algorithm 1 JSMA perturbation method
X(e) and X(t) are acoustic features of enrollment and testing
utterances, respectively. Sθ is the system function with param-
eters, α is the step size,  is the perturbation degree, and N is
the number of iterations. Γ is a mask matrix having the same
size withX(t), initialized with all-one element matrix E.
Input: X(e),X(t), Sθ , α, , N
1: X(t)adv =X
(t), Γ = E, δX = 0
2: for i ∈ [1, N ] do
3: G = ∇
X
(t)
adv
Sθ(X
(e),X
(t)
adv)
4: M = saliency map(G,Γ)
5: kmax = argmaxkMk
6: δX [kmax] = clip0,(δX [kmax] + α× sign(Gkmax))
7: if |δX [kmax]| ≥  then
8: Γkmax = 0
9: end if
10: X(t)adv =X
(t) + δX
11: end for
12: return X(t)adv
2.3. Dataset generation
Our experiments are conducted on the Voxceleb1 [32] dataset,
which consists of short clips of human speech. There are in total
148,642 utterances from 1251 speakers. Following data parti-
tioning in [32], 148,642 utterances from 1211 speakers are used
to train the ASV systems, and the remaining 4874 utterances
from 40 speakers are used for testing the systems and generating
adversarial samples. The corpus [32] provides totally 37,720
trials consisting of enrollment-testing utterance pairs selected
from the testing utterances.
For each attack configuration, including the substitute ASV
system, perturbation method and perturbation degree, we gen-
erate an “adversary-genuineness” dataset consisting of both ad-
versarial and genuine samples. To make a balanced dataset, for
each genuine utterance, we randomly select one trial where that
utterance is used to generate an adversarial counterpart accord-
ing to the attack configuration by Eq. 1. Then there are around
9K utterances in each “adversary-genuineness” dataset, includ-
ing around 4.5K adversarial and 4.5K genuine utterances.
To evaluate the detection network, we separate the
“adversary-genuineness” dataset of each attack configuration
into training and testing subsets, with 30 speaker’s data for
training and 10 speaker’s data for testing. The speaker parti-
tioning for training and testing is consistent among all attack
configurations. This guarantees that source utterances (either a
genuine utterance or an adversarial utterance generated from it)
in the testing subsets cannot be observed during training.
3. Adversarial Samples Detection
In this section, we present our proposed system to detect adver-
sarial samples. To detect adversarial samples, we adopt Mel-
frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCCs) unfolding in time as
the input feature map forwarded to our detection network. A
pre-emphasis with coefficient of 0.97 is adopted. “Hamming”
window having size of 25ms and step-size of 10ms is applied
to extract a frame, and finally 24 cepstral coefficients are kept.
Other possible features will be investigated in future work.
Before designing the detector architecture, we notice some
issues about adversarial samples: 1) The deviation between ad-
versarial and genuine samples is subtle and localized on fea-
ture maps, and we shall adopt convolutional layers at bottom
to effectively capture such deviations; 2) The adversarial char-
acteristics exist in the whole utterance, so a pooling layer can
be adopted to aggregate the utterance statistics for decision.
Based on these considerations, we introduce a VGG-like net-
work structure [26] to detect adversarial samples. The detailed
architecture configurations are illustrated in Table 1. 4 con-
volutional layers at bottom to capture local feature patterns.
A statistics pooling layer aggregates the mean and deviation
from the last convolutional layer outputs, and forwards them
to dense layers. Finally, 2 dense layers project statistics into a
2-dimensional output space to predict whether the input is gen-
uine or adversarial. The network is trained with the Adam [33]
optimizer, along with the initial learning rate as 0.001.
4. Experiments
4.1. Evaluation metrics
To verify the effectiveness of adversarial attacks, we evaluate
the ASV system performance before and under adversarial at-
tacks in terms of equal error rate (EER) and minimum detec-
tion cost function with target trial prior to be 0.01 and 0.001,
Table 1: Detailed configurations of the proposed detector.
Layer Structure Activation
Conv2D [2× 2, 64]× 4 ReLU
Statistics Pooling - -
Flatten - -
Dense1 512, dropout 0.2 ReLU
Dense2 512, dropout 0.2 ReLU
Output 2 Softmax
i.e. DCF0.01 and DCF0.001. When evaluating the detector
performance, we report the detection accuracy (DA) over the
“adversary-genuineness” testing subset. Also, regardless of the
operating point, we use the detector’s log softmax output at the
adversarial bit as the adversarial score, and compute an EER
(EERdet) from adversarial scores over the testing subset.
4.2. Adversarial attack performance
The attack results on the x-vector system are shown in Table 2.
The results on the i-vector and r-vector systems have similar
trends. From Table 2, we observe that the ASV system per-
formance seriously drops when being attacked by both pertur-
bation methods. Also, the attack effectiveness increases as the
perturbation degree increases. However, the perturbations with
a higher degree are easier to be detected, which will be dis-
cussed in Section 4.3. This suggests a trade-off for attackers to
design an effective but cannot be easily detected perturbations.
Table 2: The x-vector system performance under different attack
configurations.
EER (%) DCF0.01 DCF0.001
genuine 5.97 0.515 0.695
BIM
 = 0.3 39.87 0.995 0.996
 = 1.0 95.02 1 1
 = 2.0 99.96 1 1
JSMA
 = 1.0 20.41 0.880 0.932
 = 3.0 48.28 0.995 0.995
 = 5.0 60.22 1 1
4.3. Robustness against perturbation degree
In this section, we discuss detector robustness against pertur-
bation degree. Adversarial samples crafted from the x-vector
system along with BIM and JSMA perturbation methods are
involved. The system detection accuracy (DA) under differ-
Table 3: Detection accuracy (%) against perturbation degrees
BIM-xvec training
 = 0.3  = 1.0  = 2.0
evaluation
 = 0.3 99.83 48.65 48.61
 = 1.0 99.82 100.00 87.01
 = 2.0 99.83 100.00 100.00
JSMA-xvec training
 = 1.0  = 3.0  = 5.0
evaluation
 = 1.0 99.44 59.84 48.61
 = 3.0 99.83 100.00 98.41
 = 5.0 99.83 100.00 100.00
Table 4: Detector performance against ASV systems
DA (%) trainingBIM-ivec BIM-xvec BIM-rvec
evaluation
BIM-ivec 99.87 99.78 99.44
BIM-xvec 99.65 99.83 99.39
BIM-rvec 72.45 76.38 99.70
EERdet (%)
training
BIM-ivec BIM-xvec BIM-rvec
evaluation
BIM-ivec 0 0.18 0.55
BIM-xvec 0.46 0.18 0.65
BIM-rvec 6.27 5.90 0.28
ent conditions is shown in Table 3. The diagonal results are
based on in-domain evaluation, which reflects the proposed bi-
nary classifier is effective and can distinguish the adversarial
and genuine data distribution with an accuracy over 99%. It is
also observed that the detector can generalize well from adver-
sarial samples with a small perturbation to a larger perturbation.
However, the performance drops greatly in the reverse direction.
This indicates that we should craft small perturbations to de-
velop our detector, so that it could defend ASV systems against
adversarial samples with equal or higher degrees very well.
4.4. Robustness against substitute ASV systems
In this section, we investigate detector robustness against sub-
stitute ASV systems. We conduct experiments on the BIM per-
turbation method with  = 0.3 attacking three different ASV
systems, i.e. i-vector, x-vector and r-vector systems. The exper-
iment results based on JSMA method have similar observations.
The DA and EERdet are shown in Table 4. From DA results,
we observe that the detector achieves high detection accuracy in
most unseen cases, even though the system architectures are to-
tally different. To see how the detector characterizes adversarial
samples crafted from in-domain and unseen ASV systems, we
visualize the output adversarial score distribution for genuine
samples, in-domain and unseen adversarial samples, e.g. train-
ing on r-vector while evaluated on i-vector system as shown in
Fig. 1. It shows the detector can generalize well to unseen ASV
systems by assigning most of adversarial samples high adver-
sarial scores. For some cases where a low DA occurs, e.g. train-
ing on i-vector while evaluated on r-vector system (72.45%), the
detector still achieves an acceptable EERdet (6.27%). This in-
dicates the detector still works well but there needs a shifted
operating point to detect adversarial samples.
4.5. Robustness against perturbation methods
In this section, we investigate detector robustness against per-
turbation methods. Detector performance is evaluated by ad-
versarial samples crafted from BIM and JSMA attacking on the
x-vector system, as shown in Table 5. We observe a general-
izability of 10.15% EERdet from JSMA to BIM and 50.55%
EERdet from BIM to JSMA. This indicates the generalizabil-
ity is not symmetric and can drop greatly in some cases to be
a random guess (50.55% EERdet). This phenomenon shows
a limited detector robustness against unseen perturbation meth-
ods. The detector trained on a combination of both methods can
perform well on both, which suggests that we could enlarge our
training dataset to include as many existing perturbation meth-
ods as possible to enhance our model’s robustness. To deal with
unseen perturbation methods, we believe that a proper combina-
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Figure 1: The adversarial score distribution for genuine sam-
ples, and adversarial samples crafted from in-domain and un-
seen ASV systems (training: BIM-rvec, evaluation: BIM-ivec).
tion of observed perturbation methods can reinforce the detec-
tor’s robustness against unseen perturbation methods. We leave
this combination strategy to be investigated in future studies.
Table 5: Detector performance against perturbation methods
DA (%) trainingBIM JSMA combined
evaluation BIM 99.83 57.73 99.48JSMA 48.61 99.44 99.09
EERdet (%)
training
BIM JSMA combined
evaluation BIM 0.18 10.15 0.46JSMA 50.55 0.46 0.92
5. Conclusion
This work proposes to defend ASV systems against adversar-
ial attacks using a separate detection network, which offers the
feasibility to develop a unified countermeasure against all ma-
licious attacks. A VGG-like network architecture is introduced
to determine whether an input is a genuine or an adversarial
sample. Our results demonstrate that the proposed detection
network is effective on detecting adversarial samples. To inves-
tigate detector robustness in a realistic defense scenario where
unseen attack settings exist, we give a further analysis on var-
ious attack settings. We observe that the detector is relatively
robust against substitute ASV systems, while the generalizabil-
ity among perturbation methods is not symmetric and detec-
tor performance could drop greatly in some cases. The weak
robustness against unseen perturbation methods shows a direc-
tion for developing stronger countermeasures. The utilization
of observed perturbation methods to improve detector robust-
ness against unseen perturbation methods will be investigated
in future studies.
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